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Panu Minkkinen, Sovereignty, Knowledge, Law, Routledge, 2009, x + 178 
Cormac Mac Amhlaigh, Edinburgh Law School. 
 
The question of the relationship between power and law is one of the enduring controversies 
of modern liberal political and legal theory. The struggle for supremacy between law and 
power in modern society can be framed in a variety of ways, including democracy versus rule 
of law, security versus liberty, and might versus right. This conflict also runs to the core of 
the concept of sovereignty where it is expressed in the more abstract register of sovereign 
power versus the sovereignty of the norm. More specifically, the tension in the register of 
sovereignty represents rival attempts to give content to the notion of ultimate authority, the 
hallmark of the concept since Bodin and Hobbes. In his recent book, Sovereignty, 
Knowledge, Law, Panu Mikkenen interrogates the concept of sovereignty from both sides of 
the tension—norm and power—as well as, more abstractly, an epistemology of sovereignty. 
In the first section of the book, the epistemic foundations of the supremacy of the 
norm are investigated through a deliberate focus on continental, particularly Germanic, legal 
theory. The first chapter is a study of the work of Hans Kelsen, who provided perhaps the 
clearest modern account of sovereignty as norm through the concept of the Grundnorm 
presupposed in relation to the Constitution. Kelsen famously equated the state—and by 
implication sovereignty—with its legal system, rejecting the dualism of juristic and 
sociological conceptions of the state common in contemporary legal theory. What Minkkinen 
adds to debates on Kelsen’s work is an illuminating account of Kelsen’s methodology in 
developing his pure theory of law. As Minkkinen emphasises, Kelsen’s project of developing 
a legal science necessitated considerable groundwork on a scientific methodology. This 
would then clear the way for a pure normative science, a pure theory of law, cleansed of the 
impurities of political theory or sociology. For Kelsen, Minkkinen concludes, the method of 
legal science was as important, if indeed not more important, than its subject (26). 
This discussion of Kelsen is complemented in Chapter 3 with a discussion of Kant’s 
critical philosophy, where Kelsen’s debt to Kant is made readily apparent. Reading Kant’s 
philosophy of law as a ‘preamble to the law of knowledge in general’ (45), Minkkinen makes 
a convincing case in support of the contention that before Kant, the very idea of a science of 
law was impossible. In this Kantian scheme, sovereignty does not relate to the factual power 
of one social agent over another but rather entails a ‘conceptual framework for normative 
validity as the transcendental precondition of law’ (47). As with Kelsen, Minkkinen finds in 
Kant a claim that the very possibility of law and legal system necessitates a normative 
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framework within which norms, not raw power (49) reign supreme, and the sovereignty to 
legislate stems from an a priori principle inferred from reason. (52). Thus,  
Sovereignty, the supreme power to which one submits oneself, is a postulate in a 
similar way as the postulates concerning freedom, the immortality of the soul and the 
existence of God are in the second critique (58). 
Thus making the conceptual step from Kant’s a priori law to Kelsen’s Grundnorm a small 
one. By way of juxtaposition, Chapter 2, sandwiched between Kelsen and Kant, provides an 
account of alternative juristic theories by Kelsen’s contemporaries, particularly those of the 
German constitutional jurist George Jellinek, who, unlike Kelsen, was comfortable with the 
dualistic conception of the state and propagated the heresy that constitutional law was part of 
a broader theory of the state.  
 The second section of the book explores the relationship between sovereignty and 
forms of power, juridical, political and factual. In Chapter 5, the notion of sovereignty as a 
form of political power which founds but also preserves the state is considered through a 
discussion of the concept of constituent power as well as Carl Schmitt’s work on political 
ontology and the nature of sovereignty. The sovereignty-power relationship is further 
nuanced in Chapter 6 where the reader is given a rather exhaustive (and exhausting) overview 
of Michel Foucault’s work on the typologies of power in contemporary society; classic 
sovereignty, discipline and governmentality, which operate according to their own internal 
rationality. There is nothing particularly new in these discussions for those who are familiar 
with Schmitt and Foucault. However, what Minkkinen adds is a depth to the analysis by 
drawing on original-language texts as well as shedding light on perhaps more neglected 
aspects of their work. For example, his assertion that Foucault’s notorious call for the 
metaphorical decapitation of the monarch was not a call to dispense with law and sovereignty 
but rather represented a ‘new rationality of law that annexes itself to the judicial rationality’ 
(97) and the section on Schmitt contains an interesting, if somewhat unsettling, discussion of 
the spatial element of Schmitt’s conception of the state (89–93). Chapter 4, which opens this 
section, does seems somewhat misplaced, however, relating as it does an ethos of 
sovereignty. Here the reconciliation of sovereignty in terms of power with the norms of 
international law is analysed and a broad sweep through the development of international law 
is provided, concluding with a slightly obscure discussion of Derrida’s resolution of the 
putative paradox of the plenary sovereign state bound by the norms of international law as a 
contest of rival sovereignties. However, the link or possible tensions between sovereignty as 
a form of power (political or otherwise) with the notion of sovereignty qua status entailing 
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rights and duties is not developed here, notwithstanding its centrality to the question of the 
essence of sovereignty. 
  The final part of the book, the acephalous subject, is framed by the political 
philosophy of Hegel. Here, the focus is on Hegel’s notion of the state as an ethical substance 
analogous to the family, constituting the ‘manifest substantial will revealed to itself that 
knows and thinks itself and accomplishes what it knows and in so far as it knows it’; 
presaging a dense and difficult series of chapters. Given that sovereignty is an essential 
characteristic of the state, sovereignty is also a manifestation of ‘self-knowledge and of self-
consciousness in ethical being’ (115) reasons Minkkinen. This theme of sovereignty as (self-) 
knowledge is then worked out in subsequent chapters through various (mainly French) 
Hegelian thinkers. Kojeve’s exegesis of Hegel receives particular attention including his 
notion of recognition as being (121) and his definition of sovereignty as the ‘plenitude of 
subjective rights’ (126), that is sovereignty as absolute freedom in the absence of any duty or 
obligation. This is then further explored in the subsequent chapter through the work of the 
French mystic Georges Bataille. For Bataille, in an echo of the potential unpredictability of 
Schmitt’s exception, sovereign moments  
take place as inner experiences, highly subjective sensitivities concerning the 
unknown that, in essence, are antagonistic in relation to the idea of an architectural 
perfection that scientific thinking represents (135). a 
The final chapter then moves through the necessarily ever-abstract implications of 
sovereignty as knowledge through Lacan and Freud; Lacan, in particular ending on a 
sceptical note as to the structural possibility of pure sovereignty given that this radically 
autarkic conception is shackled to the symbolic order (156), primarily expressed here in 
terms of language. 
 Unpicking the premises and point of these difficult works in this section is not a job for 
the faint-hearted and while an admirable effort is made here by Minkkinen, one gets the 
feeling that it may have been as much an exercise of conceptual ground-clearing for himself 
as an attempt to elucidate or critique the Hegelian canon for a broader audience. The chapters 
move with an alarming alacrity from Hegel to Kojeve on Hegel, to Bataille on Kojeve on 
Hegel with excursuses on Blanchot on Bataille and Nancy without so much as a pause for 
breath. These are challenging works even for the initiated, and only those with a good 
familiarity of the general contours of the works will have the interest (and the stamina) for 
this final section. For this reviewer, it was simply too quick a journey through too dense 
material in order to make the attempt worthwhile. 
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More generally, the book lacks a central argument or position in relation to the 
various discussions referenced, beyond the rather thin umbrella of sovereignty. In his 
exposition of the work of different thinkers on sovereignty over the centuries, from Bodin to 
Bataille, Minkkinen provides a summary of various parts of their work, relying on large 
chunks of direct quotation to back up a particular point or assertion. The themes and theorists 
are dealt with rather schematically and the book is perhaps therefore best approached as a 
reference book, where one can dip in and out of sections in order to glean insights into, for 
example, Hegel’s master/slave dialectic and how it relates to the concept of sovereignty 
rather than to be read in a linear way (which a reviewer must invariably do). Even allowing 
for this interpretation of the purpose of the book, however the text is, at times, a little dense, 
and some of the expositions of the works under consideration are almost as prolix as the 
original works themselves (clearly not helped by the fact that it relies heavily on hefty chunks 
of direct quotation) thereby limiting somewhat its utility as a reference book. 
Moreover, the structure of the book is a little haphazard. The seemingly Weberian 
titles of each section would suggest that the book deals methodically with the various 
dimensions of sovereignty: heteroceplous—not being subject to higher authority (putatively 
reflecting the internal/constitutional dimension of sovereignty); heterocephalous—literally 
‘multi-headed’ (the international realm and the sovereign equality of states); and the 
acephalous or ‘headless’ subject (capturing the radical openness of sovereignty as 
knowledge). However the mismatch between section title and content quickly becomes 
apparent when the discussion in each section wanders off in various directions, sometimes 
jumping between themes within the same section, sometimes introducing various musings on 
unrelated topics (an interesting but inexplicable aside on the common etymology of the words 
‘hostility’ and ‘hospitality’ on pp. 93-4 being a case in point). Notwithstanding the fact that 
the book’s signposting is slightly awry, the substantive discussions of sovereignty’s legal, 
political and metaphysical dimensions are considered and illuminating, if at times, heavy-
going.  
In sum, in Sovereignty, Knowledge, Law, Minkkenen has produced an impeccably 
researched volume which would be recommended for those with a very particular interest in 
the philosophical dimensions of sovereignty, power and authority. It provides a very good 
overview of wide-ranging works, including some more obscure writings on the subject, and 
contains some fascinating insights into the broader questions regarding its subject matter. 
However it is not the easiest read and the casual reader with only a passing interest in these 
questions will find the book somewhat esoteric and would be better directed elsewhere.  
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